


SECRET
[REDACTED]

25X1



THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

NFAC-8337-81

21 December 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: [REDACTED]

25X1

Acting National Intelligence Officer
for Western Europe

SUBJECT: Discussion Paper for NSC Meeting: Poland

REFERENCE: Memo for James Nance from ES/State, dtd 21 Dec 81

1. The paper does not make clear at what point in the evolving Polish situation the various measures being suggested for consideration would be invoked. The implication is that most of the anti-Soviet measures should be implemented by the Allies even before massive Soviet intervention. The memorandum notes that it "will be no easy matter...to get Allied unanimity"; this is an understatement: policymakers should have no illusions.

2. Under "B. ...ACTIONS WHICH COULD BE UNDERTAKEN WITHIN A MATTER OF DAYS," Number 6 under actions vis-a-vis the Soviet Union/others suggests rapid ratification in NATO capitals of Spanish Alliance membership. This measure could easily prove counterproductive. Some Allies are already nervous lest Spanish membership be taken as a "provocative" gesture toward the Bloc and encourage Soviet pressures on Yugoslavia, for example, for Warsaw Pact membership. The Spaniards themselves would not be pleased by Alliance linkage of their membership to the Polish situation.

25X1

3. In general, I note the absence of any positive inducements to influence the present situation. Admittedly it is getting a bit late in the game; nevertheless, there may still be some mileage to be made with the promise of eventual economic and financial aid should the reform process be allowed to continue. From the West European point of view, such an offer--which might even include the idea of reminding Poland that the Marshall Plan remains open--would be no

All paragraphs
classified Secret.DERV CL BY SIGNER
REVW ON 21 DEC 1987SECRET
[REDACTED]

25X1

SECRET


25X1

more open to fears of Western "interference" in the internal Polish situation than some of the denial measures proposed for consideration.

4. Virtually all commentary from Western Europe, including that tending towards a very tough Western reaction, rules out "penalizing" the Soviets in the arms control field for actions in Poland. The Europeans do not believe that--whatever else may be contemplated vis-a-vis Moscow--arms control negotiations should be held hostage. The arms control "track" of NATO's INF decision will continue to be held necessary if the deployment "track" is to be kept open.

 25X1

-2-

SECRET


25X1

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Discussion Paper for NSC Meeting: Poland

FROM:

Acting NIO for Western Europe

EXTENSION

NO.

NFAC-8337-81

25X1

DATE

21 Dec 81

25X1

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1.

Chief, IAS/OPP, Rm 7E19

2.

3.

DCI

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

DCI:
This arrived too late for your meeting. You may wish to read Herup's thoughts in any case.

ILLEGIB

25X1